THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE THIRD PERSON:
PERCEPTUAL BIASES OF MEDIA HARMS & CRIES FOR
GOVERNMENT CENSORSHIP

Clay Calvert*

[I]t is difficult to find a censor who will admit to having
been adversely affected by the information whose dissemination is to be prohibited. Even the censor's
friends are usually safe from pollution. It is the general
public that must be protected.'

A primary issue in First Amendment 2 jurisprudence is determining when harm caused by expression is sufficient to abridge an individual's or
entity's freedom of speech. 3 Because an "absolutist" interpretation of the First Amendment never
has been adopted by the United States Supreme
Court, 4 "[1]ine drawing is inevitable as to what
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* 1 W. Phillips Davison, The Third-Person Effect in Communication, 47 PuB. OPINION Q. 1, 14 (1983).
2 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part that Congress shall make no
law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. U.S.
CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses
are incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause to apply to state and local governments. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925).
3

See RODNEY A.

SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY

4 (1992) (stating that "we ponder when it is appropriate for
the state to control public discourse for the perceived greater
good").
4 Despite the literal language of the First Amendment
that suggests that Congress can never make any law abridging
freedom of speech, "[t] he fact is that First Amendment law is
far more complex than the Constitution's command." JOHN
H. GARVEY & FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: A
READER 169 (2d ed. 1996). "Although the First Amendment
is written in absolute language that Congress shall make 'no
law,' the Supreme Court never has accepted the view that the
First Amendment prohibits all government regulation of expression."

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw:

PRN-

750 (1997).
5
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at 751. Bollinger observes
that "since no one has ever been willing to contend that every
speech act under all circumstances should be protected, we
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speech will be protected. ' 5 Courts must strike a
balance between the values of freedom of expression 6 and the government's regulatory interest in
7
punishing or stopping speech.
The government's interest inevitably involves
either preventing or compensating for harm allegedly caused by speech.8 Libel law, for instance,
compensates for reputational harm allegedly
caused by defamatory falsehoods. 9 Indecent
broadcast speech is regulated because of the,
harm it allegedly causes children.' 0 Televised
must necessarily embark on a decisional process of exclusion
and inclusion for which we very quickly find we need some
theoretical guidance beyond what the language itself offers."
LEE

C.

BOLLINGER,

THE

TOLERANT

SOCIETY,

SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA

FREEDOM

OF

5-6 (1986).

6 Traditional values of free expression embodied in First
Amendment jurisprudence range from discovery of the truth
and promoting democratic self-governance to self-realization
and self-fulfillment. See generally THOMAS I. EMERSON, ToWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3-15
(1966) (describing the functions of freedom of expression in
a democratic society and identifying individual self-fulfillment, attainment of the truth, participation in decision-making, and balancing stability and change as values of free
speech). It has been observed that "[a]cceptance of one rationale need not bump another from the list, as if this were
First Amendment musical chairs." SMOLLA, supra note 3, at 5.
7 See Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law 792
(2d ed. 1988). In striking that balance, the dominant First
Amendment ideology is that "[h]urtful speech might conceivably be of some value to society and therefore the proper
answer to that speech is not censorship, but more speech."
David S. Allen, Freeing the First Amendment: An Introduction, in
FREEING THE FIRST AMENDMENT

3,

4 (David S. Allen & Robert

Jensen eds., 1995).
8

See

HARRY WHITE, ANATOMY OF CENSORSHIP: WHY THE

CENSORS HAVE IT WRONG

41 (1997) (observing that the ra-

tionale "[t] hat certain expression needs to be prohibited because of the harm it causes remains for many the censors
(sic) most powerful and compelling argument").

9 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341
(1974).
10 See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d
654, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that the government "has
an independent and compelling interest in preventing mi-
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images of violence are regulated in the name of
reducing aggressive behavior and real-life violence." Efforts are made to regulate pornography because of the harm it causes women and society.1 2 Cigarette advertising is restricted in the
name of preventing teens from starting the harm13
ful behavior of smoking.
As a society, we fear the harmful effects of these
and other media-propagated images.' 4 Susceptibility to the influence of mass media messages is,
after all, a quality that we intuitively and readily
ascribe to others. 15 We often develop, in turn,
laws based on our beliefs and assumptions about
the harmful effects of media messages on others.
But what if our beliefs and perceptions about
alleged media harms are systematically wrong?
What if we, in fact, typically overestimate the harm
caused by mass media messages? What if we unnecessarily censor speech?
There is a strong and growing body of empirical social science research from the field of communication that suggests that much of our First
Amendment jurisprudence and efforts to censor
speech may be radically off base. Specifically, the
research supports what has been called the thirdperson effect hypothesis. 16
The hypothesis "predicts that people will tend
to overestimate the influence that mass communications have on the attitudes and behavior of
nors from being exposed to indecent broadcasts").
11 The Parental Choice in Television Programming section of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 calls for the establishment of a television ratings code for programs that
contain violent or sexual content. See 47 U.S.C. § 303(w)
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others." 17 Parsed differently, the hypothesis, as
originally articulated in 1983 by W. Phillips
Davison, holds that "[i] n the view of those trying
to evaluate the effects of a communication, its
greatest impact will not be on 'me' or 'you,' but
on 'them'-the third persons.""'
Now, 15 years and many empirical experiments
and studies later, evidence supports this hypothesis. u That evidence has disturbing ramifications
for extant and future First Amendment jurisprudence. It suggests the government may be unnecessarily censoring speech based on a perceptual
bias about its effects on others.
An example-censorship of sexually explicit
speech-makes the danger clear. Empirical research suggests that people systematically judge
others to be more negatively influenced by pornography than themselves. 20 In turn, people
"favor restrictions on pornography in line with
their perceptions of effects on others."2' 1 This is
important because some experimental research
also suggests that people systematically overestimate media effects on others. 22 The ramifications, communication researcher Albert C. Gunther of the University of Wisconsin-Madison
notes, are profound - "if people are systematically
overestimating the negative social-level effects of
pornography, then the third-person effect may be
23
inflating opinion in favor of censorship."
17

Id.

18
19

Id.

(Supp. 1997). See generally Marci A. Hamilton, Reconceptualizing Ratings:From Censorship to Marketplace, 15 CARDOZO ARTS &

See Vincent Price et al., Third-PersonEffects of News Coverage: Orientations Toward Media, 74 JOURNALISM & MASS
COMM. Q. 525, 525 (1997) (stating that the third person effect "has been well documented by more than a decade of
empirical study").

ENr. L.J. 403 (1997) (describing the Parental Choice in Telecommunications Programming section and alternatives to

20) See Albert C. Gunther, Overrating the X-Rating: The
Third-PersonPerceptionand Supportfor Censorship of Pornography,

it).

J. COMM., Winter 1995, at 27, 35.

See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d
323, 325 (7th Cir. 1985).
13
See 21 C.F.R. § 897.2 (1997). In April, 1997, a federal
district court judge ruled that although the FDA had jurisdiction over tobacco products, it was beyond the scope of its authority to enforce the new advertising regulations. See John
Schwartz, judge Rules that FDA Can Regulate Tobacco, WAsH.
POST, Apr. 26, 1997, at Al.
14
"[T]he effects of the mass media are a major concern
in our society-a concern, incidentally, that has existed since
the beginning of mass communication when monarchs and
religious leaders stifled printing to curb political dissent, reform, and new ideas that threatened the established order."

See id. at 36.
See id. at n.10. See also Hernando Rojas et al., For the
Good of Others: Censorship and Third PersonEffect, 8 INT'LJ. PUB.
OPINION RES. 163, 182 (1996) (reporting the results of an
empirical study on the third person effect and concluding
that "[a] significant part of the apprehension caused by media effects results from the overestimation of its effects on
others"). An alternative explanation, of course, would be
that people underestimate the actual influence on themselves while they accurately estimate the influence on others.
Research, however, rebuts this self-underestimation explanation, with Douglas M. McLeod of the University of Delaware
and his colleagues observing that "[flor the most part, the
literature indicates that people do in fact overestimate the
effects of media content on others." Douglas M. McLeod et
al., Support for Censorship of Violent and Misongynic Rap Lyrics,
24 COMM. RES. 153, 155 (1997).
2
Gunther, supra note 20, at 37.

12

JAMES WILSON AND STAN LE Roy WILSON, MASS MEDIA/MASS

CUUIURE 407-08 (4th ed. 1998).
15
See Albert C. Gunther & Paul Mundy, Biased Optimism
and the Third-Person Effect, 70 JOURNALISM Q. 58, 58 (1993).
16 See Davison, supra note 1, at 3.
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The finding is not limited, however, to pornographic speech. Recent empirical research also
supports the third-person effect hypothesis in the
context of perceptions about harm caused by24
and the need for censorship of-rap music.

Douglas M. McLeod of the University of Delaware
and his colleagues conducted a survey on the relationship between third-person effects and censorship of rap lyrics. 25 They found both that participants in the study perceived others to be more
influenced by rap lyrics and that "this perception
was strongly related to support for censorship,
even after controlling for other important variables." 26 In particular, McLeod and his colleagues found that the "impact of third-person
perceptions on support for censorship was strong
despite controlling for several correlates- of censorship (gender, conservatism, social desirability
of the content and knowledge of and liking of the
content in question)." 2 7 They conclude "[i]f it is
the case (as research seems to indicate) that thirdperson perceptions are based on an overestimation of effects on others, the desire for censorship
caused by third-person perceptions is built on a
flawed foundation. Any censorship that results
from misperceptions may in fact be unnecessary
censorship.1

2s

Other research suggests, in the context of defamation by the media, people may overestimate
the extent of reputational injury caused by a defamatory statement and, as a result, overcompen29
sate plaintiffs with excessive monetary damages.
Inflated awards against the press that often cause
a chilling effect on investigative reporting, in
other words, may be based on biased perceptions
30
and assumptions.
24
25
26

See McLeod et al., supra note 22, at 165.
See id. at 160-61.
Id. at 165.

Id. at 168.
See id. at 165.
SeeJeremy Cohen et al., Perceived Impact of Defamation:
An Experiment on Third-PersonEffects, 52 PUB. OPINION Q. 161,
27
28
29

172 (1988).
SO See generally David A. Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Cen-

sorship, 53 TEX. L. REv. 422 (1975) (describing the impact of
large damage awards in libel cases on journalism).
3.1 See infra Part I.
32
See infra Part I1.
33

JEREMY COHEN & TIMOTHY GLEASON, SOCIAL RESEARCH

IN COMMUNICATION AND LAw 110

(1990).

Id. at 109. Social science data used to inform legislative judgment in making laws are called "legislative facts."
34

JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAw:

CASES AND

MATERIALS

143 (3d ed. 1994) (citing Kenneth

In summary, our false assumptions about media
effects may lead to legislation and jury verdicts in
a wide range of areas that erroneously punish
freedom of expression. That is the profound danger of legal scholars and legislators who choose to
ignore-or who simply are unaware of-the growing body of social science research on the thirdperson effect.
Bridging social science and law, this interdisciplinary article initially explains the third-person
effect and presents an overview of some of the research conducted to date that has been published
in peer-reviewed social science journals.3 The article then explores the implications of this re32
search for First Amendment jurisprudence.
Although it is clear that "[f]aw is not lame without social science

[,]"

33

communication science

"may play an important role in the development

of legal theory." 34 Largely ignored by First
Amendment scholars until now, 3 5 the third-per-

son effect research requires legal attention-it
suggests thatjudges, legislators, and juries may be
overestimating the harmful effects of mass communication messages and, as a result, unnecessarily censoring and punishing individuals and enti3
ties for their speech. "

I. THE THIRD-PERSON EFFECT
The third-person effect, in a nutshell, "predicts
that people perceive greater persuasive media influence on other people than on themselves.

'3 7

It

seems to be "one variant of a general belief that
the outcomes of some event will be more unfavorable at the societal level (for other people) than
at the personal level (for me)." 38 It is a "percepCulp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, HARV. L. REV. 364, 402 (1942)).
35
The third-person effect research has been mentioned
briefly in passing in only two law journal articles. See Clay

Calvert, Harm to Reputation: An InterdisciplinaryApproach to the
Impact of Denial of Defamatory Allegations, 26 PAC. L:J. 933, 937
n.31 (1995); David McCraw, How Do Readers Read? Social Science and the Law of Libel, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 81, 92 (1991).
36 See Price et al., supra note 19 (stating that the "tendency to .perceive that other people are more greatly influenced by the media than ourselves could well have important
consequences" including "even legal ramifications").
37
Paul D. Driscoll & Michael B. Salwen, Self-Perceived
Knowledge of the O.J. Simpson Trial: Third-Person Perception and
Perceptions of Guilt, 74JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 541, 551
(1997).

"8 L. Erwin Atwood, Illusions of Media Power: The Third-Person Effect, 71 JOURNALISM Q. 269, 279 n.I (1994).
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tual phenomenon" 39 that is based on "inferential

biases [in] the assignment of mass media effects." 4 o

Today, a large number of studies provide
"abundant support for the notion that individuals
assume that communications exert a stronger influence on others than on themselves." 41 What's
more, a "significant part of the apprehension
caused by media effects results from the overestimation of its effects on others." 42 The remainder
of this Part of the article elaborates on the thirdperson effect and some of the research conducted
that illustrates and explains its existence.
A.

Components of the Third-Person Effect

The third-person effect hypothesis has two components-a perceptual bias and a behavioral re43
sponse in conformity with that perceptual bias.
The perceptual bias-that people will estimate effects of media messages on themselves to be less
than the effects on others-has considerable empirical support. 44 A 1993 review by Richard
Perloff of the third-person research conducted
from 1983 through 1992 revealed support for the
perceptual bias component of the third-person ef45
fect in 13 of 14 studies.
In his seminal work on the third-person hypothesis, Davison used an anecdote to illustrate the
perceptual bias. 411 He asked journalists a series of
questions about how much they thought their
newspaper editorials had influenced the thinking
of their readers. 47 Davison was struck by "the extent to which many journalists were convinced
that editorials had an effect on other people's attitudes, while discounting the effect on people like
themselves." 48 This personal observation and
others led to his formation of the third-person ef41
fect hypothesis. 9
This perceptual bias may relate in some circum-

43

Price et al., supra note 19.
Atwood, supra note 38, at 270.
Rojas et al., supra note 22, at 165.
Id. at 182.
See McLeod et al., supra note 22, at 154.

44

See id.

39
40
41
42

45 See Richard M. Perloff, Third-PersonEffect Research 19831992: A Review and Synthesis, 5 INT'LJ. PUB. OPINION RES. 167
(1993).
46 See Davison, supra note 1, at 2.
47 See id.
48
Id.
49 See id. at 3.
50
See Gunther & Mundy, supra note 15, at 60.
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stances to what has been called biased optimism.5 0
Biased optimism is "the tendency for people to
think they are less likely to have negative or unde5
This is a form
sirable experiences than others."1
of ego enhancement, and research suggests that
people attribute particularly savvy responses to
themselves to bolster their own sense of compe52
tence and self-worth.
The research also suggests that the perceptual
bias component of the third-person effect is
greater when message content is deemed to be
negative. 53 Positive or desirable messages, on the
other hand, are less likely to elicit the third-person effect. 54 This suggests that people who perceive particular media messages as harmful or
negative are more likely to be subject to the thirdperson effect with regard to the impact of those
messages. In a nutshell, "it seems that messages
considered harmful, dangerous, or more broadly,
schema discrepant, are those most likely to elicit
the third-person effect in communication.."55 In
addition, individuals who are more involved in a
topic-who have stronger views-are more
56
predisposed to the third-person effect.
The danger for censorship arises when the
perceptual bias is linked with a behavioral component-that biased perceptions of media effects result in behavior, such as laws and regulations, intended to protect the public from the perceived
negative effects of media messages. 5 7 As McLeod
and his colleagues state, "few media researchers
would dispute the importance of a perceptual bias
that leads to support for censorship. "58
Although there is less support for the behavioral component, three empirical studies pub
lished in the past three years have found support
for it in the areas of censorship of pornography,
television violence, and rap lyrics. 59 These, of
course, are three of the hottest areas today in
which regulations have either been called for or
51

Id.

See id. at 66-67. Gunther and Mundy found "that while
the third-person phenomenon is indeed a robust effect, it re52

sults at least in part from people's tendency toward an optimistic bias in making judgments about the differences between themselves and others." Id. at 66.
53
See Rojas et al., supra note 22, at 166.
54 See id.
55 Id. at 167.
56

See Price et al., supra note 19, at 526.

See McLeod et al., supra note 22, at 154-55, 157.
Id. at 168.
59 See Gunther, supra note 20, at 36; See McLeod et al.,
supra note 22, at 168; See Rojas, et al., supra note 22, at 182.
57
58
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enacted. On the other hand, another study found
a lack of empirical support for the behavioral
component of the third-person effect in the context of calls for restricting press coverage of crimi60
nal trials.
The fact that a trio of recent studies supports
the behavioral component-namely, calls for censorship-of the third-person effect cannot be ignored. Future replications of these studies may
confirm the earlier findings of the link between
the perceptual bias and behavioral response to
that bias. As noted above, individuals are more
predisposed to the third-person effect when
messages are perceived as having negative consequences. 6 1 People have long perceived media
portrayals of violence and pornography as having
negative consequences. 62 Thus it is not surprising
to find the existence of a third-person effect in
these areas, and it would not be surprising to find
such an effect in other areas involving "negative"
messages such as cigarette and alcohol advertising.

B.

63

Some Limitations on the Research Findings

Whether the third-person perception actually
causes censorship is not something that social science research can definitively prove. John
Monahan and Laurens Walker write in Social Science in Law "that social science research (or, indeed, research in any other area of science, including physics) never 'proves' anything in the
sense of concluding that any assertion is absolutely true or absolutely false. Rather, it assigns a
probability to the truth or falsity of assertions that
are tested." 6 4 Statistical procedures can only de-

termine the probability that an observed difference or change noted in a experiment or survey
was caused by chance. 6 5 When researchers state

that their findings achieved statistical significance,
this "does not prove that the variables being inves60
See Michael B. Salwen & Paul D. Driscoll, Consequences
of Third-Person Perception in Support of Press Restrictions in the
O.J. Simpson Trial, J. COMM., Spring 1997, at 60, 72. This
study, however, used the O.J. Simpson case-a truly aberrant

criminal matter-as its focus.
61
See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
62
See Leon Friedman, Symposium Introduction, 22 HOFsTRA L. REv. 775, 776-77 (1994).
63 See Rojas et al., supra note 22, at 182-83 (suggesting the
third-person effect may be applicable to a number of advertising issues including ads for potentially harmful products).
64 MONAHAN & WALKER, supra note 34, at 79.

tigated caused the difference, it only says that the
difference exists and is probably not just a random occurrence.."66

The survey data used to

demonstrate the relationship between a perceptual bias and calls for censorship thus can at best
show a correlation but not causation.
Despite these limitations, the empirical data are
there for legal scholars and legislators to consider.
The next part of this article argues that the data
should not, at the very least, be ignored by those
who advocate censorship of mass media messages
because of their supposedly harmful consequences.
II.

LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS

The legal ramifications of the third-person research are profound. We may be censoring and
punishing speech conveyed by the mass media unnecessarily and without justification. As Hernando Rojas and his colleagues observed recently
in the International Journal of Public Opinion Research, "If part of the drive to curtail certain types
of messages results from the third-person effect,
policy debates have to recognize this and concentrate on measuring actual media effects and not
perceived media effects.

'67

Unfortunately, there is no debate in the legal
community about this issue. Legal scholars and
legislators have ignored the crucial body of social
science research on the third-person effect. Calls
for censorship, instead, are based largely on
hunches and assumptions about media effects
that are tainted by perceptual biases. Most disturbingly, the research is ignored at a time when
censorship has become one of the most salient is68
sues in American society.
Censorship, of course, "is a social instinct."69
Media messages, in turn, have long been a target
of this social instinct.70 Motion pictures were
targeted as far back as the 1920s for their alleg65

See id.

66

THOMAS

R. BLACK, EVALUATING

SEARCH: AN INTRODUCTION

SOCIAL

SCIENCE

RE-

11 (1993).

67

Rojas et al., supra note 22, at 182 (emphasis added).

68

See Richard Hense & Christian Wright, The Development

of the Attitudes Toward Censorship Questionnaire, 22 J.

Soc.

PSCYHOL.

1666 (1992).

APPLIED.

"[F]ree speech is in more

trouble today than it has been in decades." Kathleen Peratis,

Banning Speech Does Not Cure Social Ills, 22 HOFSTRA L. REv.
801, 803 (1994).
69
SMOLLA, supra note 3, at 4.
70
"[T]he mass media have the potential to influence au-
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edly harmful effects on children 7' and, in fact,
once were not recognized by the United States
Supreme Court as a form of protected speech
under the First Amendment. 72 During the 1980s,
books were "the most challenged form of expression."7 - Today, "[tlelevision is perhaps the favorite target of powerful effects critics . . . [and]

74
video games are a close second favorite."
Our social instincts about the direct and powerful effects of the media, however, are extremely
naive. Communication researchers long ago rejected what has been described as the magic bullet theory or hypodermic needle theory of direct,
powerful, and largely uniform media effects on
audience members. 75 Despite this fact, many people still believe that media messages can have direct and powerful effects on an essentially passive
audience. 76 In brief, the bullet theory held that
"[m] essages only had to be loaded, directed at the
target and fired; if they hit the target audience,
then the expected response would be forthcom-

ing. " 7 7

Communication is, of course, a much more
complex process with any number of variables
and contingent conditions influencing the ultimate impact of a message on the recipient. 78 Media messages certainly do have effects, but they
are not all-powerful as we often assume. 7" Their
impact may be mediated by factors such as selective perception, 0 involvement,8 ' and source credibility.8 2 In brief, "the statement that 'it depends'

is an accurate description of the answer to many
questions about media effects."8
The problem for the law and freedom of expression is clear. When the third-person effect is
coupled with our simplistic assumptions about-the
power of the media, we censor speech because we
assume that it causes harm, regardless of whether
it really does. 84 We assume causation of injury
from speech based on instincts tarnished by
perceptual biases.
Politicians are increasingly driven by numbers

dience behavior, and throtghotLt the years there has been an

Years in the Marketplace of Ideas, J. COMM., Spring 1993, at 58.

expression of social concern over the extent of this
power... some of this concern has been reflected in formal
and informal controls over the media." JOSEPii R. DOMINICK,
THE DYNAMICS OF MASS COMMUNICATION 548 (5th ed. 1996).

On the other hand, one social scientist who has reviewed the
literature and research on television violence concludes "that
early childhood viewing of mass media violence contributes
[only] five to ten percent to adult aggressive behavior." Ed-

71

SHEARON

A.

LOWERY & MELVIN

STONES IN MASS COMMUNICA\TION

L.

DEFLEUR,

RESEARCH

MILE-

23-24 (3d ed.

See Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio,

236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915). Motion pictures did not receive
First Amendment protection as speech until 1952. See Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (.1952).
73 'JOHN B. HARER & STEVEN R. HARRIS, CENSORSIIIP

OF

EXPRESSION IN THE 1980s 123 (1994).
74 JAY BLACK ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO MEDIA COMMUNICATION 38 (5th ed. 1998).
75

22

HOFSTRA

80

1995).
72

ward Donnerstein, Mass Media Violence: Thoughts on the Debate,

See WERNERJ. SEVERIN & JAMES W. TANKARD, JR., COM-

MUNICATION THEORIES: ORIGINS, METHODS, AND USES IN THE

MASS Media 247 (3d ed. 1992).
76
See id.
77 BLACK ET AL., supra note 74, at 38. It has been suggested that the bullet theory was really never adopted by
communication researchers but merely a straw-man theory
set up for purposes of comparison. See Steven H. Chaffee &
John L. Hochheimer, The Beginnings of PoliticalCommunication
Research in the United States: Origins of the "Limited Effects"

Model, in THE MEDIA RFVOLUTION IN AMERICA AND IN WESTERN
EUROPE 267 (Everett M. Rogers & Francis Balle eds. 1985).
78 SeeJeremy Cohen & Albert C. Gunther, Libel as Communication Phenomena, COMM. & LAw, Oct. 1987, at 9, 27 (observing that communications "researchers view communication as a process containing a series of steps within complex
interactions among people. Normally, people neither receive, nor act on, communication in a void.").

See

L. REV. 827, 829 (1994).

MELVIN

THEORIES OF

L.

DEFLEUR &

SANDRA

MASS COMMUNICATION

J.

BALL-ROKEACH,

196-97 (5th ed. 1989)

(observing that "the principle of selective perception is that
people of distinct psychological characteristics, subcultural
orientations, and social network memberships will interpret
the same media content in very different ways").
See Steven H. Chaffee & Connie Roser, Involvement and
the Consistency of Knowledge, Attitudes, and Behaviors, 13 COMM.
81

373, 376 (1986) (observing that the concept involvement as a contingent condition governing mass media effects
has been a part of communication research since 1965).
RES.,

82

See generally RICHARD E. PErrY &JOHN T. CACIOPPo, AT-

TITUDES

AND

PERSUASION:

CLASSIC AND

CONTEMPORARY AP-

61-65 (describing the concept of source credibility
and its ability to influence the impact of media messages).
8-3 SEVERIN & TANKARD, supra note 75, at 265. "Contemporary analyses of mass media persuasion have focused on
the variables that determine when the media will be effective
versus ineffective and what the underlying processes are by
PROACHES

which the media induce change." Richard E. Petty & Joseph
R. Priester, Mass Media Attitude Change: Implications of the Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion, in MEDIA EFFECTS: ADVANCES IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 91, 94 (Jennings Bryant &

Dolf Zillmann eds., 1994).
84 Assumption of injury from speech is involved in the
traditional "bad tendency" justification for penalizing speech.
See David M. Rabban, The FirstAmendment in Its Forgotten Years,

The media, for instance, are very effective in setting
the public's agenda-telling people what issues are salient

90 YALE L.J. 514, 543 (1981). Likewise, libel law traditionally
has presumed harm from defamatory speech without proof

and worthy of discussion. See Maxwell E. McCombs & Donald
L. Shaw, The Evolution of Agenda-Setting Research: Twenty-Five

of actual injury. See David A. Anderson, Reputation, Compensation, and Proof 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 747, 748 (1984).
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from public opinion polls when they propose and
craft legislation.8 5 If the public opinion that they
follow is susceptible to the influences of the thirdperson effect when it comes to the impact of mass
media messages, an entire body of legislation may
be created that unnecessarily restricts expression.
Michael Schudson observes that "[t] he assumption that gullible others, but not one's own canny
self, are slaves to the media is so widespread that
the actions based on it may be one of the mass
media's most powerful creations."8' 6 Going one
step further, our biased assumptions of the media's influence affect our restrictions of First
Amendment freedoms of speech and press. Ultimately, the "consequences are costly when actions, based on inaccurate perceptions of the
opinions of others, take on the force of law." 8 7
Legal scholars, legislators, and judges, of
course, are welcome to consider legal issues of
free speech in a vacuum that ignores real-world
data about media effects. To do so, however,
would be a grave mistake. Free speech is too valu85

See

STEVEN H.

SHIFFRIN,

THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DE-

RoMANCE 63 (observing that "[p]oliticians are
to some extent influenced by public opinion, and they
MOCRACY, AND

should be"). Some studies have suggested that politicians
are motivated to action based on their beliefs about the public's reactions to media messages." Salwen & Driscoll, supra
note 60, at 62. During the 1992 presidential election campaign, for instance, Bill Clinton "followed what the polls told
him, and did well by being a good populist." EDWIN DiAMOND & ROBERT A. SILVERMAN, WHITE HOUSE TO YOUR
HOUSE: MEDIA AND POLITICS IN VIRTUAL AMERICA 125 (1995).

able to be suppressed because of ill-formed assumptions about the power of media messages.
The third-person effect literature, in turn, provides helpful context for legislators who react to
public opinion polls and their perceptions about
how other people are influenced by the media. It
can provide the kind of "enlightened skepticism"
about our current rules and restrictions on
speech that former United States Supreme Court
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes found so valuable
to the development of the law. 88
In summary, our perceptual biases about media
harms may create and perpetuate entire areas of
law that are both unnecessary and unfounded.
They should not. As Abraham Kaplan wrote more
than thirty years ago, it "is absurd to make claims
about matters which depend on evidence and yet
ignore the scientific attempt to get the evidence."8 9 There must be, in other words, a "transaction between social science and social policy."911
The research on the third-person effect must be
part of that transaction.
Today, "no one doubts the importance of polling and other
forms of 'interactivity' in the Clinton White House." Id. at
126.
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